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Short Selling and Politically Motivated Negative Information Hoarding 
 
Abstract 
Extant literature documents that managers have an incentive to hoard bad news due to political 
concerns. In this paper, we test the proposition that short selling has an attenuating effect on the 
politically motivated suppression of bad news. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese 
public firms around two highly visible political events - meetings of the National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party and Two Sessions (The National People’s Congress Conference and 
The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) from 2002-2014, and find that political 
bad news hoarding has been reduced after short selling becomes available. We establish causality 
by relying on a difference-in-differences approach based on a controlled experiment of short 
selling regulation changes in China. We also find this reduction in bad news hoarding to be more 
pronounced in firms with stronger political connection (higher state ownership and larger size) and 
higher accounting opacity, which further confirms our finding. This study sheds new light on the 
real effects of short sellers on political impact on capital market.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we identify the real effects of short selling on the impact of political force on 
firms’ bad news hoarding. Although short selling is controversial, and regulators in many countries 
impose short selling ban when financial market is highly volatile, a growing literature suggests 
that short sellers have a positive externality to real corporate activities such as firms’ reporting 
practices (Massa, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015; Fang, Huang, and Karpoff, 2016), actual corporate 
investment (Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston, 2015), and innovation (He and Tian, 2016). 
However, this line of research has paid little attention to the real effects of short selling on 
politicians’ or politically connected managers’ behaviors such as their incentive to hoard negative 
news around significant political events. Politicians and governments have an incentive to avoid 
negative news about their activities (e.g., Peltzman, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), and the 
impact of this behavior has become an important concern for financial market participants and 
investors. In this paper, we provide evidence that short sellers can mitigate the impact of political 
incentive on the underlying financial reporting and information environment of listed companies.   
Identifying the real effects of short selling has been proved difficult. The main challenge 
is the endogeneity problem. In order to address this issue, we exploit multiple regulation shocks in 
short selling within China. Since 2010, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (henceforth, 
CSRC) has been gradually including stocks that meet certain requirements into a short selling 
designated list, and this list has been updated over time. Each update can serve as a quasi-
exogenous shock to the short selling constraints faced by firms. The fact that stocks become 
eligible for short selling on different dates implies that the likelihood that comparisons are affected 
by contemporaneous changes in market-wide factors will be reduced (Bessembinder, 2000). These 
regulatory changes create both time-series (before and after the regulation change) and cross-
sectional (stocks eligible for short selling vs. stocks not allowed for short selling) variation in short 
selling constraints. This identification strategy lowers the possibility that other factors are 
responsible for lowering politically motivated negative news hoarding and thus is able to identify 
the causality between short selling and political incentive to hoard negative financial information. 
Under this identification, we match pilot stocks to other non-shortable peer firms in the same 
industry, and then employing a Difference-in-differences (hereafter, DiD) approach to investigate 
the changes in political negative news hoarding around short selling regulation changes.    
In order to proxy the magnitude of political negative news hoarding, we follow ongoing 
literature (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian, 2009; Kim, Li and Zhang, 
2011a; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011b; Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang, 2015; Kim and Zhang, 2016; Kim, 
Li, Lu and Yu, 2016) and calculate crash risk and stock price synchronicity measures for several 
windows around the political events in China. When politicians or politically connected managers 
have an incentive to hoard negative news, a higher post-event crash risk or a lower post-event 
synchronicity is expected. We examine two visible political events - meetings of the National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and Two Sessions (The National People’s Congress 
and The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) from 2002-2014, which is similar to 
Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang (2015). There are more than ten meetings in total during this time 
period. These meetings together with the changes in short selling list provide both time-series and 
cross-sectional variations in both short selling constraints and political negative news hoarding. 
This mostly mitigates the concern that any single structural break other than short selling 
regulation changes has a causal effect on the changes in political negative news hoarding.  
Prior research documents that China’s public firms are linked with a poor information 
environment (Piotroski and Wong, 2012), which can be characterized by highly synchronized 
stock prices with general market movements (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) and by a lower level 
of disclosure and corporate transparency (Jin and Myers, 2006). China values social conformity 
and the maintenance of relationship. Releasing information that attracts unwanted attention from 
public and other related parties is costly. Thus, politicians and politically connected managers have 
a tendency to hide bad news, especially the news that could result in a “loss of face” for local 
politicians and even central government when the news countered the expectation of government 
or investors. Their tendency of hiding bad news is particularly strong around highly visible 
political events, such as Communist Party Meeting and “Two Sessions” we study in this paper. 
These unique features in China’s financial market ensure that our empirical setting is ideal to 
capture the pure effects of political negative news hoarding and the real effects of short selling on 
attenuating these negative externalities induced by political news suppression.  
Studies on short selling argue that it disciplines management’s opportunistic behaviors by 
attacking firms that exhibit financial misconduct (e.g., Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Fang, Huang and 
Karpoff, 2016; and Massa, Zhang and Zhang, 2015). As short sellers convey negative information 
to the market through their research and trading in a timely fashion, their presence makes it difficult 
for management to hide unfavorable information. This helps to improve the information 
environment of those politically connected firms and we should expect that politicians or 
politically connected managers are less likely or able to hoard negative news. Our finding confirms 
this conjecture. Using several short selling list changes as a controlled experiment, we find that 
after short selling becomes available, the magnitude of negative news hoarding around those 
political meetings becomes smaller for treated stocks (short selling eligible firms) relative to 
controlled stocks (matched non-shortable stocks).   
Thus far, our results show that short selling has an attenuating effect on political bad news 
hoarding. To confirm this finding and understand the underlying mechanisms, we perform several 
cross-sectional tests. First, we hypothesize that the attenuating effect will be stronger for meetings 
with the most significant influence. To this end, we partition our sample by the importance of 
political events, and we find that the documented effect is stronger for major party meetings, which 
is consistent with our prior. Compared to “Two Sessions”, the major party meetings are the most 
influential national meetings which identify party leaders, highlight key developments and set 
major party/country objectives for the next five years. Therefore, this finding strengthens our 
argument of the role short sellers play in attenuating the politicians’ incentive / ability to hoard 
bad news.  
Then, we study the information environment of the firm on its ability/incentive to hoard 
bad news. We partition our sample by using proxies such as firm size and state ownership to gauge   
firms’ information environment. In China, the largest firms are usually highly connected with 
central government, and some large companies (e.g. Sinopec, PetroChina, and CRRC Corporation) 
are even directly controlled by central government. Therefore, we expect that our results to be 
stronger for these key large firms. Our finding is consistent with this expectation. Similar to large 
firms, firms with high state ownership create a natural incentive for politicians and managers to 
release information that is consistent with central government’s mission. Therefore, the probability 
of hoarding bad news is higher for these firms than firms with lower state ownership. Our empirical 
results do show that firms with higher state ownership have stronger attenuating effects, which is 
in line with our conjecture.   
Lastly, we partition our sample by firms’ reporting opacity. Political news hoarding is 
expected to positively correlate with reporting opacity. Local politicians, bureaucrats and 
politically connected managers face unique tradeoffs with respect to corporate transparency. Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000) document that highly political economies have a preference for 
accounting systems that produce smooth, low volatility (i.e., less informative) earnings. Therefore, 
when releasing bad news is costly, politically connected managers have a preference to report their 
earnings in a non-transparent way. Given this discussion, we hypothesize that the mitigating effect 
of short selling on political bad news hoarding is more pronounced for firms with higher reporting 
opacity. To measure firms’ reporting opacity, we follow Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney’s (1995) 
modification of Jones’s (1991) residual accruals and compute the discretionary component of 
accruals. We find that the mitigating effect of short selling on political bad news hoarding is more 
pronounced for firms with higher discretionary accruals, which further confirms our main findings.  
This study contributes to the literature from the following three aspects. First, our study 
provides the first analysis, to the best of our knowledge, of the real effects of short selling market 
on the impact of political force on financial market. While the standard short selling literature 
directly links short selling to stock prices (Senchack and Starks, 1993; Asquith and Meulbroek, 
1995; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Boehmer and Wu, 
2013; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011), and a growing literature links 
short selling to real corporate activities (e.g. Fang, Huang, and Karpoff, 2016; Grullon, Michenaud, 
and Weston, 2015; He and Tian, 2016; Li and Zhang, 2015; Massa, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015), we 
contribute by directly highlighting the role that short sellers play in mitigating the impact of 
political force on listed entities’ financial reporting, disclosure, and dissemination of information.  
Second, instead of looking at the effects of a single event our study employ multiple 
political events and multiple regulation changes in financial market. Our findings provide novel 
evidence to both finance and accounting literature and eliminate several alternative explanations 
that are likely the result of analyzing a single event.  
Lastly, our study is a natural extension to the literature on the impact of political force on 
listed entities. Our findings suggest that the lifting of market frictions such as short selling 
constraints can mitigate the impact of political force, improving financial market quality and 
market efficiency.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discuss the empirical methods. 
Section 3 describes data and sample. In Section 4, we present initial univariate results. Section 5 
presents our identification to investigate the causality between short selling and politically 
motivated bad news hoarding. Section 6 shows the mechanisms through which shorting activities 
influence political bad news hoarding. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical Methods 
2.1. Political Events in China Creating an Incentive for Politicians to Hoard Negative News 
Our empirical tests search for the aforementioned pattern in stock returns of Chinese listed 
firms in the periods immediately preceding and following two anticipated political events: 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and Two Sessions (The National People’s 
Congress and The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), for before and after short 
selling becomes allowed. Existing literature has suggested that these highly visible political events 
asymmetrically heighten the costs of releasing adverse news for the affiliated politicians and 
politically connected managers (Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang, 2015). If sufficiently large, these 
costs create an incentive to temporarily suppress the flow of negative information; the result would 
be an observed decrease in negative stock return distribution during the politically-sensitive event 
window (i.e. before and during the meetings) relative to non-event periods (i.e. post meeting 
period), followed by an increase in negative return distribution as the incentive to suppress 
alleviates after the event.  
The National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is held once every five years, and 
represents the most significant central government meeting in China. Over our sample period, this 
National Congress was held in calendar years 2002, 2007, and 2012. These meetings outline 
central government policy, identify party leaders, highlight key developments and set major 
party/country objectives for the next five years. An article appeared in the official newspaper China 
Daily on November 14, 2012 at the conclusion of the 18th meeting is an example of the news 
coverage expected on these important meetings:  
“The international community has attached great importance and spoken highly of the 18th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which successfully concluded on Wednesday. 
It is believed that the important guidelines formulated at the congress have directed China's 
future development and contributed to world peace and development.” 
 Two Sessions refers to the annual plenary sessions of the national or local People's Congress 
and the national or local committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. 
Two sessions, as they are colloquially known in China, are an important bellwether for assessing 
government policy in a one-party state where most decisions take place behind firmly closed doors. 
Around 3,000 provincial administrators, top businessmen and Chinese Communist Party bigwigs 
are expected to attend. Panel A in Table 1 provides a summary of the meetings we study in our 
analysis.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
These two types of meetings in China are quite important, and releasing negative 
information during congress window inherently contradicts the objective of these meetings and 
would be expected to impose a high political cost on the local politicians and politically connected 
managers. Additionally, these meetings draw considerable domestic and international attention. 
To the extent that investor, public and political scrutiny are elevated around a National Congress, 
the politicians have an incentive to delay the releases bad news during this event window.  
 
2.2. Measuring Stock Price Crash Frequency and Synchronicity 
To proxy the magnitude of negative news hoarding, we compute several stock price crash 
risk measures and stock price synchronicity. We use stock price crash risk and stock price 
synchronicity following standard approach in the literature (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton, 
Marcus and Tehranian, 2009; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011b; Kim and 
Zhang, 2016; Kim, Li, Lu and Yu, 2016; Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang, 2015).  
In order to measure firm-level stock price crash risk, we utilize two crash statistics that 
reflect the presence of large and negative stock price movements. These measures, NCSKEW and 
DUVOL, are taken from Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Jin and Myers (2006), and is similar to 
the measure used in Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) and Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011). Because 
we focus on the variation in the flow of negative information around the congress meetings, we 
use the firm-level daily residual return rather than weekly return to calculate the crash risk 
measures. To obtain firm-level residual return 𝜀𝑗𝑡, we estimate the following regression for each 
event period 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛽5𝑗𝑟𝑚,𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡        (1) 
where, 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is the return on stock j on day t and 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 is the value weighted market return on day t. 
We also include lead and lag market returns to account for nonsynchronous trading.  
Following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011), our first measure 
of crash risk is the down-to-up volatility (DUVOL) as defined below: 
  𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔⁡[
(𝑛𝑢−1)∑ 𝜀𝑗𝑡
2
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛
(𝑛𝑑−1)∑ 𝜀𝑗𝑡
2
𝑢𝑝
]                                                                      (2) 
where nu and nd are the number of up and down days, respectively. Specifically, for firm j in each 
event period t, we first separate all the days with firm-level residual returns below the mean for 
each meeting (down days) from those with firm-level residual returns above the mean for each 
meeting (up days). We then calculate the standard deviation, separately, for each of these two 
subsamples. Then, DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard deviation of the down days to the 
standard deviation of the up days. A higher DUVOL suggests a higher crash risk.  
Following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), Jin and Myers (2006), and Kim, Li, and Zhang 
(2011), the second measure of crash risk is NCSKEW, which is the negative skewness of firm-level 
residual returns over the given meeting period. We compute NCSKEW as in Eq. (3) 
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑗𝑡 = −
[𝑛(𝑛−1)3/2∑𝜀𝑗𝑡
3]
[(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)(∑ 𝜀𝑗𝑡
2)3/2]
            (3) 
where n is the number of days. 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is firm-level residual return for firm j and event period t. A 
higher NCSKEW suggests a higher crash risk. 
To measure stock price synchronicity, we follow Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000). We firstly 
regress raw daily stock returns on contemporaneous and 4 days of lagged market returns over the 
given meeting period. Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−4 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−3 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (4)                                                          
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the return on stock i and 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 is the value-weighted market return on negative 
return day t. Stock price synchronicity is calculated as natural log of the R-squared from estimating 
equation (4) to 1-R-squared. 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑅2
1−𝑅2
                                                                       (5) 
The synchronicity measures the proportion of systematic volatility due to contemporaneous market 
movement relative to total volatility. It reflects how fast stock prices incorporate current market-
wide information as supposed to lagging systematic and non-systematic information. A higher 
synchronicity usually indicates lower price efficiency, and vice versa. 
 
2.4. Measuring Politically Motivated Negative News Hoarding 
We use differences in crash risk and synchronicity to capture the magnitude of the 
incentive/level of political negative news hoarding. The way we are estimating Politically 
Motivated negative news hoarding is consistent with Piotroski et al. (2015), who study listed firms 
in China and find higher stock price crash risk and lower stock price synchronicity during the post 
political event period than the pre-period, suggesting that politicians have an incentive to hoard 
negative information.  
As documented earlier, we calculate two crash risk measures and one synchronicity measure. 
Therefore, we propose in total three measures to proxy the magnitude of politicians’ negative news 
hoarding accordingly. The first measure is the difference between NCSKEW for the post meeting 
period and pre meeting period1, which can be written as the following equation  
                                                            
1 We define pre and post meeting periods as the three months before and during the meeting, and the three months 
after the meetings. As a robustness check, we also define alternative event windows as three months before and after 
the meetings, but skipping the meeting days.  
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = ⁡𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 −𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑒       (6) 
When politicians have more incentive/ability to hoard negative information, NCSKEW for the post 
political event period is expected to be higher than the pre event period. Thus, A higher 
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 indicates a higher level of politicians’ negative news hoarding.  
The second measure is the difference between DUVOL for the post meeting period and pre 
meeting period, which can be written as the following equation 
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = ⁡𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑝𝑟𝑒        (7) 
Similar to 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓, a higher 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓  indicates a higher level of politicians’ negative news 
hoarding.  
The third measure is the difference between 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ for the post meeting period and pre 
meeting period, which can be written as the following equation 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = ⁡𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑝𝑟𝑒        (8) 
Piotroski et al. (2015) articulate when politicians have an incentive to hoard negative news, stock 
price synchronicity is higher before and during the political events, compared to the period after 
the political events. Thus, a lower 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 indicates a higher level of politicians’ negative news 
hoarding.  
 
3. Data and Sample 
We obtain data on accounting measures and stock market returns from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream for a period from 2002-2014. We collect data for all firms with data available on 
Datastream. We use Datastream’s list of active and dead stocks to avoid survivorship bias. After 
excluding financial firms, our sample is composed of 1,966 firms with 685 short selling eligible 
firms. We define all variables in Appendix 1.  
The crash risk measures are constructed by using firm level daily returns which are 
calculated by using the daily total return index from Datastream. Datastream retains the values of 
Total Return Index for a long time after the stock is delisted. To account for this we get each 
stock’s last non-zero return day, and set to missing all the zero-return dates that follow. We then 
use the method proposed by Ince and Porter (2006) to filter outliers.  We winsorize daily returns 
at 1st and 99th percentiles. We winsorize all accounting variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles.  
The short selling data (daily short interests) is provided by CSMAR (Chinese Stock Market 
and Accounting Research Database). Short selling data is available from March 31, 2010, which 
is the date CSRC announced the removal of ban on short selling and margin trading. In our sample 
in total there are 685 stocks eligible for short selling. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of 
all main variables used in our empirical tests.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4. Short Selling and Politicians’ Ability to Hoard Negative Information: Initial Evidence 
In this section, we investigate the relation between short selling and political bad news 
hoarding. Using changes in stock price risk around important political events in China, Piotroski, 
Wong, and Zhang (2015) find evidence that politicians have an incentive to hoard negative 
information. We rank all short selling eligible firms into high and low groups by average daily 
short interests since short selling becomes available in China.2 We, then, report the average crash 
risk measures and synchronicity measure 3 months before and after the political events by all short 
selling groups. We report the results in Table 3. Before short selling becomes available, we find 
                                                            
2 We firstly calculate average daily short interest ratio by averaging daily short interests scaled by trading volume. 
We identify firms with short interest ratio lower than median ratio as low group otherwise high group.  
post-event crash risk is consistently higher than pre-event crash risk for both high and low short 
selling group, and all short selling eligible stocks; stock price synchronicity is significantly lower 
for the post-event period for low group and all short selling eligible stocks. These initial results 
are mostly consistent with the finding in Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang (2015) that managers have 
an incentive to suppress bad news due to political concerns.    
As we proxy negative news hoarding as the difference between pre-event and post-event 
crash risk and synchronicity measures, we expect this difference to be smaller for crash risk 
measures and bigger for synchronicity measure. Results in Table 3 show that in high short selling 
group, this difference is significantly smaller for both crash risk measures. The difference for 
synchronicity measure is negative as expected but not significant.       
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The results from this section indicate a relationship between increased short selling and 
decreased political bad news hoarding. This finding is consistent with our conjecture, suggesting 
that more short selling is related to less political bad news suppression. However, we note that 
these results are just correlations and are subject to potential endogeneity concerns. Therefore, 
these economic magnitudes should be interpreted with caution. 
 
5. Identification 
As discussed earlier, an endogeneity concern is that omitted variables correlated with both 
a firm’s short selling and its bad news hoarding could bias the results. In this section, we address 
potential endogeneity problems by using a relatively new identification strategy in the literature: a 
DiD approach based on the quasi-natural experiment of short selling regulation changes in China 
that generates plausibly exogenous variation in a firm’s short selling constraints.  
5.1. Identifying Treatment and Control Firms 
The experiment relies on the introduction of short selling in China, which provides a unique 
opportunity for us to identify the causality between short selling and politically motivated negative 
news hoarding.3 We proceed to identifying treatment and control groups. Using Datastream we 
identify treatment firms as those who are selected into short selling list by CSRC from 2010 to 
20134, and we exclude all firms deleted from the short selling list by CSRC from being considered 
for both treatment and control firms.5 Then, we delete treatment eligible firms with no available 
accounting data and finally there are 685 firms left in the treatment group.  
Because there are in total six short selling list changes during 2010-2013, it suggests there 
are six exogenous shocks in short selling constraints. Therefore, in order to identify control firms, 
we need to form a separate control sample for each of the six treatment samples. To ensure that 
the controls are qualitatively comparable to the treatment firms, we require that control firms have 
the smallest difference in firm size (total assets) from each of their treatment peers and be from 
the same industry during the fiscal year immediately before the short selling regulation change. 
This procedure does not use any ex post information such as the firm characteristics and short 
selling data. An advantage of relying on only ex-ante information to identify treatment and control 
firms is that it mitigates the concern that the actual short position or short selling transactions are 
driven by political reasons.  
Our final sample for our DiD analysis includes 1,370 firms between 2002 and 2013. Panel 
A in Table 4 reports the results of the above procedure. We compare treatment firms with control 
                                                            
3 To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few working papers adopted the same experiment, namely, Chen, 
Dong, Gu (2016) and Yin and Ni (2017). 
4 The most recent political meeting in our sample starts on March 5, 2014, and there is no short selling list change 
around the 3-month event window.  
5 There are in total 67 stocks deleted from the short selling list by CSRC during 2010-2013.  
firms, and test for the null hypotheses that the means and medians are equal across the two groups 
before the introduction of short selling. We observe that most firm characteristics are identical 
across the two groups of firms, although some measures have different means or medians: Mean 
firm growth and median discretionary accruals are slightly higher for treatment firms.  
We use an asymmetric time window including all observations from 2002 to 2014, which 
provides better time series variations in politically motivated bad news hoarding and mitigates the 
concerns that the effects are attributable to other structural shocks. Giving the concern that 
choosing a window that is too long may incorporate noise that is not relevant to the events, we also 
study a symmetric seven-year window around the experiment event year (i.e., three years before 
and after the introduction of short selling). Both results are broadly similar.  
 
5.2. The DiD Estimation 
We start with a univariate DiD approach to compare the change in political negative news 
hoarding for treatment firms with that for control firms. Panel B in Table 4 reports the univariate 
DiD results using all three bad news hoarding measures, NCSKEWdiff, DUVOLdiff, and Syncdiff. The 
mean of NCSKEWdiff and DUVOLdiff for the treatment group both drop significantly. However, the 
means for control group do not show any reduction compared to before period. The DiD estimators 
for both measures are -0.156 and -0.069, which are significant, both statistically and economically, 
suggesting that crash risk based bad news hoarding significantly decreases after short selling 
constraints are lifted. Syncdiff  shows a similar pattern, and DiD estimator is 0.097 and significant at 
1% level.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The success of the DiD approach hinges on a key identifying assumption, the parallel trends 
assumption, which states that in the absence of treatment the DiD estimate should be zero. We 
verify this assumption by plotting mean of crash risk based negative news hoarding measures for 
7 years surrounding the introduction of short selling. In Figure 1, We observe that both treatment 
and control firms show near-parallel trends before the event, though control firms seem more 
volatile. Treatment and control firms both experience a growth during the post short selling period, 
but, as expected, treatment firms experience a much smaller increase in bad news hoarding. The 
parallel trend found in Figure 1 confirms the validity of our estimation.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Now, we employ a multivariate DiD approach to compare the change in bad news hoarding 
for treatment firms with that for control firms by estimating the following regression equation: 
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓,𝑖,𝑡⁡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓,𝑖,𝑡⁡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓,𝑖,𝑡⁡ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 +
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛽4𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟⁡ + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                     (9) 
where i indexes firm, and t indexes time (the event period either before or after the introduction of 
short selling). Short is a dummy that equals one for treatment firms and zero for control firms. 
After is a dummy that equals one for the period after the introduction of short selling and zero for 
the pre period. Control is a vector of the control variables used, which includes Sigma (the standard 
deviation of firm-specific daily returns), Return, and Return (-1), which are taken from Chen, Hong, 
and Stein (2001). Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) theorize that stocks with higher lagged stock 
returns and higher negative skewness are likely to have higher crash risk. Their model also shows 
that the lagged volatility can affect the skewness of the stock price. In addition, similar to Kim, Li, 
and Zhang (2011a) and Kim, Park, and Wier (2012), we include MB (market to book), Leverage 
(long term leverage ratio), and Size (firm size which equals natural log of total assets) to control 
firm characteristics.6 Fixed is political event and firm fixed effects.  
Table 5 reports the results from the baseline DiD analysis as described in Equation (9). In 
all specifications, the coefficient estimate before Short*After is negative and significant (positive 
and significant for 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓⁡), suggesting that treatment firms, i.e., those whose stocks can be 
shorted, exhibit a greater reduction in politically motivated bad news hoarding. In terms of 
economic significance, the coefficient estimates of Short*After across all three columns indicate 
that treatment firms, relative to control firms, experience around more than 50% drop in political 
bad news hoarding after the introduction of short selling. This difference is economically 
significant, considering that crash risk and synchronicity measures in our sample have standard 
deviation around 0.5. The results of multivariate baseline DiD regressions suggest that increased 
short selling due to the removal of short-sale constraints triggers a decrease in political bad news 
hoarding.   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5.3. Placebo Tests 
In this subsection we verify the success of our baseline DiD estimation with falsification 
tests. We counterfactually recode the dates of the short selling regulation change event to be 2004 
and 2007. This test helps alleviate concerns that our results are not due to some structural break 
surrounding the rule change. 
Specifically, we use the same set of treatment and control firms identified in Section 5.1, 
and analyze their average bad news hoarding changes around the hypothetical “event” year. Table 
                                                            
6 In the regression specification with dependent variable of 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓,𝑖,𝑡⁡, we follow the ongoing literature and do not 
include some control variables such as market to book ratio, return, and leverage to mitigate the estimation bias.  
6 reports the results. In all three specifications similar to those reported in Table 5, the coefficient 
estimates before Short*After are statistically insignificant. Our results mitigate concerns that 
decrease in bad news hoarding is caused by structural changes in the economy other than the 
introduction of short selling. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
6. Possible Sources of the Reduction in Bad News Hoarding 
Our evidence, so far, is consistent with the hypothesis that short selling alleviates firms’ 
bad news hoarding due to political concernWe now proceed to explore possible sources of bad 
news hoarding reduction induced by the increased potential for short selling. In the following 
sections, we provide analysis from the politicians’ priority of hoarding bad news, firms’ political 
connectivity, and firms’ financial reporting opacity to identify the possible sources.  
 
6.1. The Politicians’ Priority of Hoarding Bad News 
In our sample, there are two types of major political events: The National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party and Two sessions or Lianghui. Both types of events generate significant 
attention from domestic and overseas, but the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
represents the most important party meeting in China. These meetings outline central government 
policy, identify party leaders, highlight key developments and set major party/country objectives 
for the next five years. Therefore, compared to Two Sessions or Lianghui, the costs of releasing 
bad news for the politicians are higher, and the politicians have the highest priority to avoid as 
much bad news to be released as possible while the National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party is holding meetings. Thus, we expect our results to be more pronounced for this type of 
events. 
In order to test this conjecture, we partition our full DiD sample into two subsamples-one 
subsample with all observations from the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
event windows, and one subsample with all observations from Two Sessions event windows.  
In Table 7, we regress our three political bad news hoarding measures on 
Short*After*Party Meeting, in which Party Meeting is an indicator variable equaling one for the 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party sample and zero otherwise, and all other 
control variables used in our main DiD regression. The coefficient of Short*After*Party Meeting 
captures the pure effects coming with the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
events. As shown in columns 1 and 2, the coefficients of Short*After*Party Meeting are all 
negative and significant. Similarly, the coefficient in column 3 is positive and significant. The 
above results, combined together, are consistent with the view that the reduction in bad news 
hoarding is more pronounced for the National Congress of Communist Party events relative to 
Two sessions events. The results in this subsection suggest that the reduction in bad news hoarding 
is mainly coming from the significant drop in bad news, induced by increased potential in short 
selling, around these party meetings.      
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 
6.2. Political Connectivity 
In this subsection, we study the information environment of the firm on its ability/incentive 
to hoard bad news. We partition our sample by using proxies such as firm size and state ownership7 
to gauge firms’ information environment firms. In China, the largest firms are usually highly 
connected with central government, and some large companies (e.g. Sinopec, PetroChina, and 
CRRC Corporation) are even directly controlled by central government. Therefore, we expect that 
our results to be stronger for these key large firms.  
In Table 8, we present the results of our DiD regression in Eq. (9), separately, for large firms 
sample (columns 1 to 3) and the small firms sample (column 4 to 6).  As shown in columns 1 to 3, 
for large firms, we find that the coefficient on the key variable of interest, Short*After, all have 
expected signs and are significant at 1% or 5% level. In sharp contrast, as shown in columns 4 to 
6, the coefficients have either smaller magnitude or are insignificant. The above results are in line 
with the view that the attenuating impact of short selling on politicians’ influence on firms to hoard 
bad news is more pronounced for large firms.   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Similar to large firms, firms with high state ownership create a natural incentive for 
politicians to affect firms releasing information that is consistent with central government’s 
mission. Therefore, the probability of hoarding bad news is higher for these firms than firms with 
lower state ownership (see, e.g. Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang, 2015). We expect, through short 
selling in firms with higher probability of bad news suppression, the reduction in bad news 
hoarding due to political concern may be more pronounced for state owned firms.    
                                                            
7 We define large (small) firms as top (bottom) 25% largest (smallest) firms in terms of total assets, and define state-
owned firms (non-state-owned firms) or high (low) state ownership firms as top (bottom) 25% largest (smallest) firms 
in terms of state ownership. We obtain state ownership data from CSMAR.   
In Table 9, we test the above conjecture and report the results of our DiD regression in Eq. 
(9), separately, for firms with high state ownership (columns 1 to 3) and firms with low state 
ownership (column 4 to 6).  As shown in columns 1 to 3, for high state ownerhsip firms, we find 
that the coefficient on the key variable of interest, Short*After, all have expected signs and are 
statistically significant. In sharp contrast, as shown in columns 4 to 6, the coefficients have either 
much smaller magnitude or are insignificant. The above results are in line with our prior that the 
effects are more pronounced for firms with high state ownership.   
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
All the results combined, in this subsection, corroborate the notion that firms’ political 
environment or their political connectivity is an important source for short sellers to analyze firms. 
By attacking state owned firms or key large firms which have weak information environment, the 
actual bad news hoarded by firms due to political concern has been significantly reduced.     
 
6.3. Financial Reporting Opacity 
In this subsection, we test whether the documented attenuating effects are coming through 
firms with higher reporting opacity. Local politicians, bureaucrats and politically connected 
managers face unique tradeoffs with respect to corporate transparency. Ball, Kothari and Robin 
(2000) document that highly political economies have a preference for accounting systems that 
produce smooth, low volatility (i.e., less informative) earnings. Therefore, when releasing bad 
news is costly, politically connected managers have a preference to report their earnings in a non-
transparent way. Short sellers, as an external threat, can reduce the probability for firms’ financial 
misconduct by targeting firms with higher potential in misconduct (see, e.g. Fang, Huang, Karpoff, 
2016; Massa, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015). Because of the presence of short sellers and their activities, 
these firms are not able to hide unfavorable financial information as much as before short selling 
is available. Given this discussion, we hypothesize that the mitigating effect of short selling on 
political bad news hoarding is more pronounced for firms with higher reporting opacity.  
In order to test the above conjecture, we partition our sample by firms’ reporting opacity. 
To measure firms’ reporting opacity, we follow Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney’s (1995) 
modification of Jones’s (1991) residual accruals and compute the discretionary component of 
accruals. To obtain the discretionary component of accruals, we calculate total accruals first, which 
are calculated from balance sheet and income statement information. In particular, Total 
Accruals=((∆CA−∆Cash)−(⁡∆CL−∆SD−∆TP)−DP), where ∆CA is the change in current assets, 
∆Cash is the change in cash and equivalents, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, ∆SD is the 
change in short-term debt included in the current liabilities, ∆TP is the change in income tax 
payable, and DP denotes depreciation and amortization expenses. All of the numbers are scaled 
by lagged total assets. Total accruals include discretionary and nondiscretionary components, and 
the discretionary component measures managerial discretion in reported earnings more precisely. 
Therefore, to measure the discretionary component of accruals, we follow Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney’s (1995) modification of Jones’s (1991) to obtain the residuals by regressing total 
accruals on fixed assets and revenue growth, excluding growth in credit sales, for each industry 
and year. The residuals are the discretionary component of accruals.  
In Table 10, we report the results of our DiD regression in Eq. (9), separately, for firms with 
high discretionary accruals (columns 1 to 3) and firms with low discretionary accruals (column 4 
to 6).  Firms with discretionary accrual at the top (bottom) 25% are classifies into the high (low) 
discretionary group. As shown in columns 1 to 3, for firms with high reporting opacity, we find 
that the coefficient on the key variable of interest, Short*After, all have expected signs and are 
statistically significant at 1% or 5% level. In contrast, as shown in columns 4 to 6, the coefficients 
have either much smaller magnitude or are insignificant. The above results are in line with our 
prior that the effects are more pronounced for firms with high reporting opacity.   
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
All the results combined, in this subsection, suggest that reporting opacity is a channel for 
the potential for short selling to be in effect in mitigating the impact of political force on firms’ 
unfavorable financial information release.     
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate whether the potential for short selling has a disciplining effect 
on politicians’ impact on firms’ negative news hoarding. Because short selling can expedite the 
speed that negative information be impounded into stock prices, we argue that with the removal of 
short selling constraints the market can uncover bad news hoarded by politically connected 
managers.  The difficulty to hoard bad news significantly increases and the impact of political 
force on financial information release has been reduced.  
Using multiple exogenous changes in short selling constraints and a unique political 
environment design in China, we find our results are consistent with our conjecture. We find that 
the magnitude of political bad news hoarding is smaller after short selling becomes available, 
which suggests short sellers serve as a force to mitigate the effect of political force on firms’ release 
of negative information. In addition, our cross-sectional analysis suggests this mitigating effect is 
more pronounced in firms with stronger political connection (higher state ownership and larger 
size) and higher accounting opacity, which further confirms our finding and provide explanation 
to the underlying mechanisms of the documented effect. 
These results confirm the disciplining effect of short selling and offer evidence on how 
short selling add benefits to financial market and firms’ reporting quality. From this perspective, 
short selling contributes to the better information environment in stock market not only from 
disciplining corporate managers but also from influencing political environment.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
After Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fiscal year is after the introduction of 
short selling and equal to 0 if the fiscal year is before the introduction 
of short selling 
Short A dummy variable that equals 1 if the stock is designated as pilot stock 
for short selling, 0 otherwise 
Party Meeting A dummy variable that equals 1 if a stock day falls in the period of 3 
months before and after the major Communist Party Meetings, and 0 if 
a stock day falls in the period of 3 months before and after Two 
Sessions (The National People’s Congress and The Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference)  
NCSKEW The negative of skewness of firm specific weekly returns within a fiscal 
year. 
DUVOL The ratio between standard deviation of firm specific weekly returns 
for all down-weeks and the standard deviation of weekly returns for all 
up-weeks within a fiscal year. 
Sync A measure of stock price synchronicity. Higher value indicates the 
stock price is more synchronized.  
NCSKEWdiff The difference in NCSKEW for 3 months after a political event and for 
3 months before the same political event  
DUVOLdiff The difference in DUVOL for 3 months after a political event and for 3 
months before the same political event  
Syncdiff The difference in Sync for 3 months after a political event and for 3 
months before the same political event  
DAC Discretionary Accruals: it is calculated as discretionary accruals 
(Dechow et al. 1995) 
Growth Net sales or revenues (WC01001) divided by lagged year Net sales or 
revenues minus one x 100 
Leverage Long Term Debt (WC03251) plus Short Term Debt (WC03051) scaled 
by the sum of Long Term Debt, Short Term Debt, and Total 
Shareholders' Equity (the sum of preferred stock and common 
shareholders’ equity (WC03501))  x 100 
M/B Market to book ratio 
Return Annual firm-specific residual daily return 
ROA Return on Assets 
Sigma The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal 
year period.  
Short Int. Average daily short interest scaled by daily stock trading volume 
during the 3-month period pre the political meetings 
Size Natural log of firm level total assets (Datastream code: WC02999, in 
Thousand USD)  
State Ownership The proportion of shares held by the central government 
 
Tables 
Table1: Political Conferences and Revisions of Short Selling List  
This Table reports information on the political conferences and revisions of short selling list we study. 
Panel A reports information on all Communist Party meetings and Two Sessions during 2002-2014. Panel 
B reports all revisions in short selling list from March 2010 to September 2014. 
 
Panel A: Political Meetings in China 
 
Meeting Name Meeting Start date Meeting End date 
16th Communist 11/8/2002 11/14/2002 
17th Communist 10/15/2007 10/21/2007 
18th Communist 11/8/2012 11/14/2012 
9.5th Two Sessions 3/5/2002 3/15/2002 
10.1st Two Sessions 3/5/2003 3/18/2003 
10.2nd Two Sessions 3/3/2004 3/14/2004 
10.3rd Two Sessions 3/5/2005 3/14/2005 
10.4th Two Sessions 3/5/2006 3/14/2006 
10.5th Two Sessions  3/5/2007 3/16/2007 
11.1st Two Sessions 3/5/2008 3/18/2008 
11.2nd Two Sessions 3/5/2009 3/13/2009 
11.3rd Two Sessions 3/5/2010 3/14/2010 
11.4th Two Sessions 3/4/2011 3/14/2011 
11.5th Two Sessions 3/5/2012 3/14/2012 
12.1st Two Sessions 3/5/2013 3/17/2013 
12.2nd Two Sessions 3/5/2014 3/13/2014 
 
 
 
  
Panel B: Revisions of the Designated Short Selling List 
 
Effective day Announcement day No. added No. deleted No. on list 
3/31/2010 2/12/2010 90 – 90 
7/1/2010 6/21/2010 5 5 90 
7/29/2010 7/16/2010 1 1 90 
12/5/2011 11/25/2011 189 1 278 
1/31/2013 1/25/2013 276 54 500 
3/6/2013 3/5/2013  1  
3/7/2013 3/7/2013  1  
3/29/2013 3/28/2013  1  
3/29/2013 3/29/2013  1  
5/2/2013 4/26/2013  1  
5/3/2013 5/2/2013  1  
9/16/2013 9/6/2013 206 – 700 
3/28/2014 3/26/2014  1  
4/1/2014 3/31/2014  1  
4/29/2014 4/29/2014  1  
5/5/2014 4/30/2014  2  
9/22/2014 9/12/2014 218 13 900 
     
Total    985 85 900 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics on stock price crash risk, short selling activities, and other firm 
characteristics variables. The sample contains 1,366 firms listed on SHSE (Shanghai Stock Exchanges) and 
SZSE (Shenzhen Stock Exchanges) available on Datastream and CSMAR. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1.  
 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
      
NCSKEW -0.379 -0.374 0.686 -2.179 1.514 
DUVOL -0.229 -0.243 0.411 -1.367 1.050 
Sync -1.262 -1.156 0.405 -2.996 -0.781 
Sigma 0.018 0.017 0.006 0.000 0.039 
Return (-1) 0.048 0.001 0.472 -0.121 0.141 
Size 15.28 15.17 1.362 10.90 20.86 
Leverage 28.26 27.79 17.38 0.000 63.83 
M/B 2.922 2.430 1.751 0.210 6.190 
ROA 4.837 3.884 6.037 -14.23 20.15 
Growth 20.38 16.43 29.62 -34.12 86.53 
DAC -0.004 -0.010 0.139 -0.584 0.800 
Short Int. 0.017 0.004 0.026 0.000 0.145 
 
  
Table 3: Short Interests and Changes in Political Negative News Hoarding  
This table reports descriptive statistics of crash risk and stock price synchronicity measures for all short selling eligible firms, sorted by shorting 
activities level, with sample periods before and after short selling is allowed. Entire sample are firstly sorted into two groups from lowest to highest 
by short interest ratio, calculated by short interest scaled by trading volume. All measures are reported for each group. We report results in three 
panels. For the first two panels, averages for pre, post political meeting periods, and difference for both periods are reported. In the last panel, 
difference in mean negative news hoarding for each short selling group and corresponding t-statistics are reported. All measures are defined in 
Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Rank=Short Interests Variable Before   After   Diff=   
  Pre Meeting Post Meeting Post-Pre  Pre Meeting Post Meeting Post-Pre  After-Before T-stats 
Low NCSKEW -0.435 -0.272 0.163*  -0.654 -0.498 0.155**  -0.007 (-0.22) 
High NCSKEW -0.413 -0.316 0.097**  -0.438 -0.383 0.055*  -0.042** (-2.18) 
All NCSKEW -0.419 -0.284 0.135*  -0.546 -0.441 0.105*  -0.030 (-1.23) 
            
Low DUVOL -0.264 -0.166 0.099*  -0.377 -0.297 0.080*  -0.019 (-0.56) 
High DUVOL -0.255 -0.200 0.055*  -0.254 -0.238 0.016  -0.039** (-2.12) 
All DUVOL -0.260 -0.185 0.075*  -0.315 -0.267 0.048*  -0.027* (-1.68) 
            
Low Sync -1.271 -1.331 -0.060*  -1.251 -1.319 -0.068*  -0.008 (-0.66) 
High Sync -1.292 -1.319 -0.027  -1.177 -1.264 -0.088  -0.061 (-0.73) 
All Sync -1.281 -1.315 -0.033*  -1.234 -1.273 -0.039*  -0.005 (-0.78) 
Table 4: Short Selling and Changes in Political Negative News Hoarding: Univariate DiD 
Results 
This table presents results based on a unique regulatory setting in China where the regulator introduces 
short selling gradually to two stock exchanges since 2010. We match each stock added to the short selling 
list to a stock that is not allowed short selling within the same industry. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics and tests for differences for major firm characteristics. Panel B reports average negative news 
hoarding measures and difference-in-differences. We omit the event year. Column headings in Panel B 
indicate different sample periods and difference/DiD for the corresponding variables. Corresponding t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Key Firm Characteristics immediately before Introduction of Short Selling 
 
Variables Treatment Group   Control Group   Test for Differences 
 
Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  Mean  
(T-stats) 
Median 
(Chi-sq) 
Size 15.85 15.60 1.268  15.56 15.57 1.107  1.57 0.32 
M/B 3.891 3.845 1.854  3.029 2.750 1.751  1.58 2.58 
ROA 6.580 5.089 6.323  4.294 3.175 5.303  2.50 2.48 
Growth 18.86 13.27 30.98  14.50 10.41 28.12  1.82* 2.51 
DAC -0.006 -0.006 0.132   -0.015 -0.016 0.133   1.22 3.69* 
  
 
Panel B: Univariate Difference-in-Differences 
 
  Treatment Group   Control Group       
 Before After Diff  Before After Diff  Diff-in-Diffs T-stats 
NCSKEWdiff 0.123 0.058 -0.065  0.148 0.239 0.091  -0.156*** (-3.31) 
DUVOLdiff 0.073 0.029 -0.045  0.093 0.117 0.024  -0.069** (-2.36) 
Syncdiff -0.068 -0.059 0.009  -0.039 -0.127 -0.088  0.097*** (4.53) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Short Selling and Political Negative News Hoarding: Multivariate DiD Results 
This table reports results of OLS panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects. The panel is composed 
of yearly observations for 2002-2014. We omit the event year. Column headings indicate different 
dependent variables. T-statistics are displayed in the parenthesis under each coefficient. Standard errors 
adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively. All variables have been defined in Appendix 1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff 
    
After 0.096* 0.036 -0.021 
 (1.75) (1.03) (-0.97) 
Short × After -0.200*** -0.099*** 0.102*** 
 (-3.23) (-2.66) (4.03) 
Sigma 4.886* 1.380 -7.464*** 
 (1.65) (0.73) (-4.49) 
Size (-1) 0.040 0.006 0.006 
 (1.39) (0.32) (0.42) 
ROA -0.006** -0.004* 0.001 
 (-2.15) (-1.94) (0.14) 
Growth -0.006 -0.002 0.005 
 (-0.76) (-0.46) (0.27) 
Leverage (-1) -0.004 -0.001  
 (-0.13) (-0.26)  
M/B (-1) 0.008 0.004  
 (0.75) (0.64)  
Return -0.100
** -0.009*  
 (-2.23) (-1.69)  
Return (-1) 0.010
** 0.020**     
 (2.01) (2.21)  
    
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,399 10,177 9,742 
adj. R-sq 0.030 0.032 0.136 
 
  
Table 6: Placebo Tests 
This table reports placebo test results, where we define the event year counterfactually to be 2004 and 2007. 
The first three columns report results for when we define the pseudo-event year as 2004, and the forth to 
sixth columns report results for when we define the event to happen in 2007. We run OLS panel regressions 
with firm and year fixed effects. We omit the event year. Column headings indicate different dependent 
variables. T-statistics are displayed in the parenthesis under each coefficient. Standard errors adjust for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. All variables have been defined in Appendix 1.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
 NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff 
       
Short × After -0.102 -0.009 -0.019 0.099 0.029 0.102 
 (-1.23) (-0.66) (1.03) (1.00) (0.76) (1.13) 
       
Event Year 2004 2004 2004 2007 2007 2007 
with Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  
Table 7: Short Selling and Political Negative News Hoarding: Partitioned by Political 
Incentive 
This table reports results of OLS panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects, partitioned on political 
event type. We omit the event year. Column headings indicate different dependent variables. T-statistics 
are displayed in the parenthesis under each coefficient. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All 
variables have been defined in Appendix 1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff 
    
Party Meeting × Short × After -0.359** -0.287* 0.123*** 
 (-2.09) (-1.85) (3.15)    
    
Party Meeting × Short 0.273*** 0.143*** 0.235*** 
 (5.60) (3.75) (9.91)    
    
Party Meeting × After 0.063 0.019 0.038 
 (0.49) (0.17) (0.86)    
    
After 0.097* 0.040 -0.029    
 (1.75) (1.31) (-1.32)    
    
Short x After -0.136** -0.052 0.118*** 
 (-2.04) (-1.50) (4.33)    
    
With Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 16,068 15,717 14,989 
adj. R-sq 0.063 0.064 0.170 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8: Short Selling and Political Negative News Hoarding: Partitioned by Firm Size 
This table reports results of OLS panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects, partitioned on firm size. 
We omit the event year. Column headings indicate different dependent variables. Columns (1) through (3) 
report results for firms with large size, and columns (4) through (6) report the results for firms with small 
size. T-statistics are displayed in the parenthesis under each coefficient. Standard errors adjust for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. All variables have been defined in Appendix 1.  
 
  Large Firms Small Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff 
        
After 0.085 0.030 0.006 0.069 0.027 -0.087* 
 (1.32) (0.73) (0.23) (0.66) (0.43) (-1.95) 
        
Short × After -0.272*** -0.113** 0.110*** -0.168* -0.080 0.093* 
 (-2.64) (-2.08) (3.43) (-1.77) (-1.37) (1.96) 
        
With Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,596 8,427 8,019 7,456 7,274 6,941 
adj. R-sq 0.053 0.057 0.171 0.068 0.068 0.166 
 
 
 
  
Table 9: Short Selling and Political Negative News Hoarding: Partitioned by State 
Ownership 
This table reports results of OLS panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects, partitioned on state 
ownership. We omit the event year. Column headings indicate different dependent variables. Columns (1) 
through (3) report results for firms with high state ownership, and columns (4) through (6) report the results 
for firms with low state ownership. T-statistics are displayed in the parenthesis under each coefficient. 
Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables have been defined in Appendix 1.  
 
  High State Ownership Low State Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff 
        
After 0.056 0.012 -0.038 0.030 -0.020 -0.030    
 (0.58) (0.20) (-0.91) (0.42) (-0.46) (-0.97)    
        
Short × After -0.202** -0.101* 0.135** -0.143* -0.055 0.122** 
 (-1.99) (-1.68) (2.44) (-1.74) (-1.21) (2.46)  
        
With Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,687 5,568 5,175 9,067 8,861 8,536    
adj. R-sq 0.045 0.046 0.157 0.063 0.067 0.166 
 
  
Table 10: Short Selling and Political Negative News Hoarding: Partitioned by Reporting 
Opacity 
This table reports results of OLS panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects, partitioned on 
discretionary accruals. We omit the event year. Column headings indicate different dependent variables. 
Columns (1) through (3) report results for firms with high discretionary accruals, and columns (4) through 
(6) report the results for firms with low discretionary accruals. T-statistics are displayed in the parenthesis 
under each coefficient. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables have been defined in 
Appendix 1.  
 
  High Discretionary Accruals Low Discretionary Accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff NCSKEWdiff DUVOLdiff Syncdiff 
        
After 0.043 -0.005 -0.001 0.145* 0.054 -0.030    
 (0.55) (-0.11) (-0.04) (1.87) (1.08) (-0.89) 
        
Short × After -0.299** -0.148** 0.163*** -0.161* -0.060 0.078**  
 (-2.21) (-2.02) (2.99) (-1.96) (-1.31) (2.10) 
        
With Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,616 7,452 6,937 8,106 7,928 7,338 
adj. R-sq 0.047 0.050 0.170 0.069 0.068 0.163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figures 
 
Panel A: The Change of the Difference in NCSKEW for Pilot and Control Group 
 
 
Panel B: The Change of the Difference in DUVOL for Pilot and Control Group 
 
Figure 1: The Changes in Bad News Hoarding around Short Selling Regulation Changes 
This figure depicts the changes in NCSKEWdiff (Panel A) and DUVOLdiff (Panel B) for the periods of 3 
years before and after the introduction of short selling in Chinese market.   
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